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This paper investigates asymmetric eects of monetary policy over the
business cycle. We employ a two-state Markov Switching Model to model both
recessions and expansions. For the United States and Germany, we nd strong
evidence that monetary policy is more eective in a recession than during a
boom. We also nd some evidence for asymmetry in the United Kingdom and
Belgium. In the Netherlands, monetary policy is not very eective in either
regime.
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11 Introduction
The idea that the eectiveness of monetary policy measures may depend on the state
of the economy is not new. An early example in the literature is the liquidity trap
(Keynes [1936]): if nominal interest rates are at such a low level that they are not likely
to decrease further, expansionary monetary policy through the interest rate channel
will be ineective (like `pushing a string'). Recent theories provide a more explicit
link with business cycle asymmetry, by which we mean systematic dierences between
phases of the business cycle which can manifest themselves in several ways, such as
dierences in duration and in the statistical distribution of time series. Neft ci [1984]
initiated new interest in this subject, using a Markov process to study asymmetry.
Ramsey and Rothman [1996] provide a recent overview of dierent types of business
cycle asymmetries. If cyclical asymmetries can be established that are accompanied
by important dierences in the impact of monetary policy, monetary phenomena may
be a possible explanation of the observed asymmetry.
There exist at least two strands of theories in the literature which predict that
monetary policy is more eective in a recession than during a boom. The rst is
based on credit market imperfections. Bernanke and Gertler [1989], for example,
develop a model in which asymmetric information gives rise to agency costs in the
credit market, which are reﬂected in the external nance premium. These agency
costs are supposed to be inversely related to borrower net worth. The fact that net
worth moves procyclically implies that agency costs rise in recessions and decrease
during booms, which creates a propagation mechanism, known as the `balance sheet
channel' or `nancial accelerator'. During an expansion, rms can largely nance
themselves with retained earnings while balance sheets are strong, which implies that
the external nance premium is relatively low. Hence, monetary policy measures
aecting this premium do not have much impact. In a recession, however, when cash
ﬂows are low and rms become more dependent on external nance, monetary policy
measures are more likely to have a signicant impact: a monetary contraction causes
interest rates to rise, which deteriorates borrowers' balance sheets, increasing interest
rates even further through the higher external nance premium. Azariadis and Smith
[1998] develop a theoretical business cycle model based on credit market imperfections
which species, under certain conditions, an endogenous regime-switching mechanism
between dierent equilibrium states.
The credit-based explanation of business cycle asymmetries can be illustrated
in a diagram (Hubbard [1997]). In Figure 1, D is a rm's demand for investment
funds while S1 represents supply. The shape of the supply curve can be explained
as follows. Up to W, a rm can attract funds at the open market interest rate
r|i.e. it does not have to pay an external nance premium|or, alternatively, the
rm may be able to nance itself with internal funds. For investments above W,
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Figure 1: Financial accelerator
likely to rise further with the level of investment due to an increase in expected risk.
In equilibrium, investment is equal to I, which is below the level Ip that would
prevail in the absence of an external nance premium, i.e. in the case of a perfect
capital market. A contractionary monetary policy, represented by a rise in the risk-
free interest rate r, shifts the supply curve to S2. Since higher interest rates increase
borrowers' default probabilities|for instance by lowering the discounted value of their
collateral|the external nance premium will show an even stronger rise, which is
illustrated by the fact that, beyond W, S2 is steeper than the initial supply curve S1.
Hence, the eect of a monetary contraction is magnied through its impact on the
external nance premium. Obviously, the eectiveness of monetary policy through
the mechanism described here becomes greater as borrowers are more dependent on
external nance. In terms of the diagram, this means that their W is relatively low,
which is characteristic of a recession.
A second class of theories build on downward price rigidities. Ball and Mankiw
[1994] develop a model of asymmetric price adjustment in the presence of positive
trend inﬂation, based on menu costs. This approach is consistent with a convex
3short-run aggregate supply curve, as shown in Figure 2.1 The gure illustrates that
during the expansionary phase|i.e. at the relatively steep part of the aggregate
supply curve|monetary policy measures, represented by their impact on aggregate
demand (ADe), are mainly translated into changes in the price (wage) level, whereas
in a recession|i.e. at the ﬂat part of the aggregate supply curve|monetary policy,
represented by shifts in ADr, has more real eects. It should be noticed that asym-
metry over the cycle, as presented in the gure, is not only the result of a convex
aggregate supply curve, but also hinges on the assumed linearity of the short-run
aggregate demand curve.
Figures 1 and 2 also suggest that, in either phase of the business cycle, a monetary
tightening has more real impact than an expansionary monetary policy measure.
Particularly in Figure 2 this is straightforward, since the aggregate supply curve
is steeper upwards than downwards. In Figure 1, asymmetry between monetary
expansions and contractions arises because the magnication eect is larger in the
upward direction. Cover [1992], Morgan [1993] and Karras [1996a,1996b] provide
empirical evidence for this asymmetry between positive and negative monetary policy
shocks, which is to some extent complementary to the type of asymmetry|between
recessions and expansions|that is investigated in this paper.
The main purpose of this paper is to analyze whether cyclical asymmetries can be
established empirically. With respect to possible explanations of asymmetry, we only
refer to existing studies. Recent empirical work has been able to establish asymmetric
eects of monetary policy over the business cycle (e.g. Thoma [1994], Gertler and
Gilchrist [1994], Kashyap et al. [1994], Garcia and Schaller [1995]). Whereas most of
this research focuses on the United States, our paper provides evidence for a group
of ve countries. We employ Hamilton's [1989] two-state Markov Switching Model
(MSM), which provides a natural framework to analyze time-varying aspects of mon-
etary policy transmission. An important advantage of this method is that it is not
necessary to impose an explicit time pattern of expansions and recessions: most likely
switching dates between both regimes are endogenously determined in the estimation
procedure.2 In Section 2 we discuss our methodology. The results are presented in
Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
1Evans [1986] discusses several reasons why the aggregate supply curve may be convex in the
short run. See also Kaldor [1961] for an early example of a theory which is consistent with a convex
aggregate supply curve and Keynes [1936] for an early notion of downward wage rigidity.
2Alternative approaches to model business cycle asymmetry are by Thoma [1994] who uses rolling







Figure 2: Convex aggregate supply curve
2 Methodology
In order to investigate asymmetric eects of monetary policy over the business cycle,
it is necessary to use a model that can account for time-varying processes. Following
Boldin [1994a] and Garcia and Schaller [1995], we adopt Hamilton's [1989] MSM
approach, which allows for dierent regimes to capture the business cycle asymmetry.
The basic structure of this nonlinear model can be expressed as follows:
yt = XtSt + et
et  N(0; St)
where yt is a measure of real activity and Xt is a matrix of observations of ex-
planatory variables, including lags of yt, while the parameter vector S and standard
error S are specic for each regime S. In the case of only one regime, the model
reduces to a standard linear reduced-form equation. Throughout this paper, we allow
for two states (S =1 ;2), with the probabilities of changing from one regime to the






where qij is the probability of regime j in the next period, given the current regime
i. The diagonal elements of Q indicate the probability that a particular regime will
persist.
Estimation of all parameters in the system, including the elements of Q, is carried
out by a maximum likelihood procedure.3 Comparison of 1 and 2 may reveal
important dierences over the business cycle that would be ignored in a standard
linear model. Furthermore, the estimated transition probabilities provide information
on the persistence and average duration of each regime, the latter being (1 − qii)−1
for regime i. Ap r i o r i , one would expect that the elements on the diagonal are greater
than 0:5, indicating that a regime persists over at least several periods, and that the
diagonal element associated with the expansionary regime is signicantly greater than
the corresponding probability of a recession.4
With an estimated MSM model, the most likely regime sequence can be calculated,
as well as the probability for each observation to belong to a particular regime. The
latter can be determined, using the estimated likelihood function, by applying Bayes'
rule. Switching dates between alternating states can be compared to alternative
approaches of business cycle dating. The advantage of the MSM approach is that the
regime switching dates are endogenously determined and not imposed on|possibly
arbitrary|grounds. Furthermore, in most countries there is no authority, such as the
NBER in the United States, which ocially states when recessions start or end.
Obviously, the MSM approach also has its drawbacks. First of all, although the
model may be suitable to capture time varying eects related to the business cycle,
it is in fact a far more general approach. For example, regimes may be identied















which species every possible regime sequence, for all transition probabilities; fS;t is a probability
density function for regime S at time t, which depends on S and S,a n dp0;S is a probability of
regime S in the initial period. The vector p0 is determined such that p0 = p0Q. See Boldin [1992] for
a technical discussion of the estimation procedure that is performed in this paper, which is somewhat
dierent from Hamilton's original approach.
4Post-war experience suggests that expansions last much longer than downturns. An early expla-
nation of this, by Schumpeter [1939], is that the economy may be in the upward phase of the long
cycle (Kondratie), but this is not plausible for our sample period. Others (e.g. Stiglitz [1998]) claim
that business cycles, in the sense of regular periodic movements in real activity, have more or less
disappeared: economic expansions prevail in normal times, while recessions have become exceptional
periods which come as a surprise and can be eectively opposed by the appropriate macroeconomic
policy.
6that have nothing to do with cyclical phenomena and coincide with other factors,
such as a change in the monetary policy regime. Second, whereas we only consider
two-state models, the MSM approach basically allows for more regimes. A three or
four regime model may give a better description of the data, but makes the analysis|
both the calculations and the interpretation of the results|much more complicated.
Third, this type of models often have multiple solutions, and it is dicult to establish
whether the solution that has been found represents a global maximum of the likeli-
hood function. Although these problems may aect the robustness of our results, we
would like to stress that most of the estimated models in this paper yield a plausible
Q matrix and regime switching dates, consistent with a business cycle pattern.
We estimate an MSM model in which the annual growth rate of industrial produc-
tion yt is explained by its own lags and by monetary policy. We include a short-term
interest rate as an indicator of monetary policy stance.
Xt =[ yt−1;y t−2;:::;rt−1;r t−2;:::]
If the eect of monetary policy is asymmetric over the business cycle, one would
expect the coecients of rt to be greater and/or more signicant during recessions
than during booms. The short-term interest level|which is supposed to measure
the overall stance of monetary policy|also reﬂects the Central Banks' endogenous
responses to economic developments which may be anticipated and should therefore
be ineective. Hence, we also consider VAR-based innovations in the short-term
interest rate, which can be interpreted as unanticapated monetary policy shocks.
3R e s u l t s
We analyze quarterly data for ve countries (United States, Germany, United King-
dom, Belgium, the Netherlands) over an eective sample that runs from 1971Q1 to
1995Q4. The latter two countries are small, open economies with very limited mone-
tary autonomy, especially in the last part of the sample, due to their xed exchange
rates vis- a-vis the Dmark. Hence, one may ap r i o r iexpect that monetary policy is
to a lesser degree related to the business cycle than in the case of the United States
or Germany, unless the business cycle of the small, open economy and the cycle of its
anchor country are fully synchronized.
Industrial production growth yt is calculated as the dierence between the pro-
duction level (in logs) and its level four quarters earlier. It appeared to be impossi-
ble to obtain sensible solutions of the MSM model with a rst-dierenced series for
all countries except the United States. This is probably because the series is very
volatile|even after removing the seasonal pattern|for most countries, while for the
7United States it is rather smooth.5 This high volatility in quarter-to-quarter growth
makes it dicult, if not impossible, to discern a cyclical pattern. Taking four quarter
dierences results in a much smoother series, which appeared to be suitable for our
analysis.
For each country, we proceed as follows. First, we estimate an MSM that species
a pure AR(6) process for each regime, in order to obtain starting values to estimate
the more extended models. Lags that are insignicant for both regimes are dropped.6
We report this model only for the United States, in order to make a comparison with
similar studies and NBER recession dates. Next, we add six lags of the monetary
policy variable to the equation, and subsequently remove insignicant lags:











where Ly and Lr are six or less.
United States
Table 1 reports three MSM specications. The rst model, US1, is a pure AR(6)
specication. Hamilton [1989], Boldin [1994b] and Garcia and Schaller [1995] nd
that two-state MSMs that specify AR processes with quarterly GDP, unemployment
or industrial production series are able to capture important business cycle charac-
teristics. Our ndings for US1 lead to the same conclusion. The average growth rates
yt in both states imply that regime 1 can be considered as a downturn and regime
2a sab o o m . 7 The transition probabilities q11 and q22 indicate that both regimes
show persistence, but recessions are relatively short (approximately four quarters)
while expansions continue for about ve years. Figure 3 shows the probability for
each observation to belong to the recession regime, together with NBER recession
periods which are marked along the time axis. Both dating methods show a striking
similarity, which supports our MSM approach as a means to capture business cycle
chronology.
In the other two models, we extend the MSM with our monetary policy indicator
rt. Since the corresponding coecients in the three models are not very dierent,
their solutions seem quite robust. The recession probabilities in Figure 3 also show a
similar pattern: in comparison with model US1, more weight is given to the downturn
5We do not have an explanation for this dierence in volatility of the series. The fact that they
come from dierent sources and that they are constructed in a dierent way probably plays a role.
6Most MSM studies|and all those that are referred to in this paper|are able to describe business
cycles characteristics using less than six lags, which motivates our maximum lag length. We also
experimented with more extended lag structures, but this did not have much impact on the results
and did not aect our conclusions.
7These average growth rates are calculated for each regime, given the most likely regime sequence
that is determined using the Viterbi algorithm (see Boldin [1992]).
8US1









































Figure 3: Recession probabilities
in the early 1990s. The recession in 1971 that is indicated by model US2 and US3 may
be related to the NBER recession period from December 1969 until November 1970,
which just precedes our sample period. In general, our dating pattern is somewhat
lagging with respect to the NBER recession dates, which may be due to the fact that
we use growth rates of industrial production that are calculated as dierences with
respect to four quarters earlier. We also experimented with dierent starting values
of the maximum likelihood procedure, but this did not lead to sensible alternative
solutions.
US2 extends the pure AR case with six lags of the short-term interest rate rt.
Subsequently, we drop the rst three lags of rt, since these are insignicant, to obtain
model US3. This model shows a distinct asymmetry between both regimes: looking
only at signicant coecients, the accumulated eect of a change in rt in the recession
state is clearly negative (−0:0046) whereas the accumulated eect during a boom is
much less pronounced (−0:0014).
These conclusions are conrmed by Figure 4, in which the impact of a 1%-point
increase in the policy variable rt is simulated over ten quarters, using model US3.

























Figure 4: Dynamic simulations with US3
and a permanent increase of the policy variable, denoted as a `permanent shock'.
Since these simulations also take the lag structure of yt into account, they give a
more complete picture of the impact of a monetary tightening than just the estimated
coecients of the policy variable. The results are in line with our earlier observations.
Our results imply that US monetary policy exhibits asymmetric eects over the
cycle. Using very dierent empirical approaches, Kashyap et al. [1994] and Gertler
and Gilchrist [1994] provide evidence that these cyclical asymmetries can be associated
with the credit-based explanation in Section 2. Rhee and Rich [1995] investigate the
asymmetry between positive and negative monetary shocks using a MSM model that
allows for dierent inﬂation regimes. They nd that in periods of relatively high
inﬂation, particularly between 1968 and 1982, the model of Ball and Mankiw [1994],
based on downward price rigidity, is relevant for the United States. Although we are
primarily concerned with asymmetries over the business cycle in this paper, the fact
that the Ball/Mankiw model can be supported empirically over a large part of our
sample suggests that an explanation of downward price rigidity may be useful. By
contrast, Evans [1986] does not nd empirical support for the joint hypothesis that
monetary policy has a stronger impact on real output and less inﬂuence on prices
when capacity utilization is relatively low.
In sum, existing research suggests that especially the credit-based theory that
we discussed in Section 2 seems relevant to explain the observed asymmetry in the
United States. Furthermore, existing studies yield dierent results with respect to an
explanation based on a convex aggregate supply curve.
Germany
A rst analysis with a pure AR model|not reported here|showed that only the
rst ve lags of yt are signicant. Therefore we have dropped the sixth lag in our
two models in Table 2. Again, regime 1 is associated with a downturn and regime
10GER1













Figure 5: Recession probabilities
2 with an expansion, which can be inferred from the average growth rates yt and
transition probabilities qii. The recession probabilities for each observation in Figure
5 show that three economic downturns can be distinghuished. Although there is no
NBER benchmark here, these recession dates show a plausible pattern: the rst two
recessions can be associated with the oil crises, and the downturn in the early 1990s
with the recession that was also found for the United States. The last recession has
been relatively severe due to German reunication costs.
The models GER1 and GER2 show the eect of monetary policy measured by
the short-term interest rate rt: GER1 is the full specication, GER2 is the model
after removing the insignicant lags. Looking at the only remaining coecient, a
signicant asymmetric eect can be established: the negative real impact in a recession
has approximately the same size (−0:0041) as in the United States, while the eect
during a boom is insignicant. Again, dynamic simulations with model GER2, plotted
in Figure 6, conrm these conclusions: both for temporary and permanent shocks,
monetary policy is only eective after a signicant lag.
To our knowledge, there is no existing empirical research that explicitly addresses
asymmetry of monetary policy in Germany, but there are a number of studies that
investigate the importance of nancial market imperfections. Guender and Moer-
sch [1997] argue that, because of the German bank-based system, a standard bank
lending channel is not relevant, presumably because banks shield their loans portfolio
from monetary shocks. On the other hand, however, panel data studies by Audretsch
and Elston [1994], Elston [1996] and Bond et al. [1997] conclude that German rms'
investments are sensitive to liquidity constraints. Especially smaller rms are vul-
nerable, which is in line with the idea that information problems are more severe for
this group of borrowers. Although these panel data studies do not explicitly consider
the impact of monetary policy, these conclusions can be interpreted as empirical sup-

























Figure 6: Dynamic simulations with GER2
explanation of asymmetric monetary policy may be relevant.
A nal point, which may be particularly relevant for Germany, is that the charac-
teristics of recessions|including the role of monetary policy|may be very dierent
across time. The severeness of the most recent downturn can largely be attributed
to economic problems caused by German reunication (see Lindlar and Scheremet
[1998]), whereas both previous recessions are supposedly more in line with develop-
ments in other economies.
United Kingdom
Table 3 reports the estimation results of two models for the United Kingdom, with
six lags of the dependent variable. The average growth rates yt imply that regime
1 is a recession and regime 2 represents a boom. The three recessions that were
reported for the United States and Germany can also be derived from the graphs for
the United Kingdom, together with a fourth downturn around 1985 that emerges from
both gures. Actually, UK1 suggests even more frequent regime switches. In general,
this is consistent with the idea that the British economy exhibits a more pronounced
cyclical behaviour than most European economies.
It can be concluded from model UK2 that monetary policy has only signicant
real eects during a recession, although the initial eect has a wrong (positive) sign.
The accumulated eect, however, is clearly negative (−0:0086) and greater than in the
case of the United States and Germany. Further, it is remarkable that, in comparison
with these two countries, monetary policy works relatively fast|signicant negative
eects arise in the second quarter|which may be explained by the fact that many
interest rates in the United Kingdom are quickly adjusted to policy-controlled rates.
According to the dynamic simulations in Figure 8, anticipated monetary policy seems
indeed somewhat more eective than for the United States and Germany, although
the dierences are not as great as the estimated parameters suggest.
12UK1






































Figure 8: Dynamic simulations with UK2
The existing empirical literature suggests that a credit-based explanation of the
asymmetry is relevant. Panel data studies by Bond and Meghir [1994] and Bond et
al. [1997] conclude that nancial constraints play an important role in the investment
behaviour of British rms. According to Bond et al., these nancial factors appear
to be much more important for the United Kingdom than for continental European
economies (Belgium, Germany, France). Further evidence is provided by Martin
[1990], who analyzes a disequilibrium model of the credit market. Martin concludes
that credit rationing has been an important phenomenon over most of the sample
1964-1984. In addition, periods in which excess demand for credit is highest appear
to coincide with recessions.
Belgium
The results for Belgium are reported in Table 4. Looking at the average growth rates
yt, regime 1 is likely to be the recession state. In both specications, the transition
13BEL1















Figure 9: Recession probabilities
probabilities qii indicate that a recession is supposed to continue for a longer period
than an expansion. The same can be inferred from Figure 9. It is worth to notice,
though, that the fact that we look at cyclical phenomena does not necessarily imply
that the relevant switching dates should exactly mark business cycle turning points:
it may very well be the case that the alternating regimes|or, the dierent underlying
data generating processes|have a somewhat dierent time pattern than the observed
changes in real activity.
In particular model BEL2 exhibits very signicant asymmetry: in a recession,
the accumulated negative eect is −0:0105, whereas in a boom the only signicant
coecient has the wrong sign. Note also that, in spite of the fact that BEL2 is a
restricted version of BEL1, it has a higher likelihood value. The asymmetry can also
be observed in Figure 10, which shows a simulation of model BEL2.
Panel data studies by Bond et al. [1997] and Barran and Peeters [1998] conclude
that nancial constraints play a signicant role in explaining investment by Belgian
rms. Barran and Peeters also consider the dierences between rms that obtain
credit through intermediation of so-called `coordination centers', which can to some
extent be compared to the Japanese Keiretsu, and those that do not. It appears that
the latter are more credit-constrained than the former. Interestingly, only for rms
that cannot borrow from coordination centers, the risk premium is positively related
to the business cycle.
The Netherlands
The results in Table 5 imply that regime 1 indicates a recession and regime 2 is the
expansionary state. This follows from the growth rates yt, but also from the transition
probabilities which indicate that recessions are relatively short, in comparison with
expansions. The latter is also conrmed by the graphs in Figure 11: for each of the

























Figure 10: Dynamic simulations with BEL2
NET1 and NET2, it can be concluded that the coecients of rt in the recession state
are more signicant than during the expansion state. Because some of the coecients
have the wrong sign, however, their cumulative eect does not support the hypothesis
of asymmetry. This is also evident from Figure 12. Actually, the graphs suggest that a
permanent shock exhibits asymmetry in the opposite direction|i.e. monetary policy
being more eective during a boom|but it should be taken into account that most
of the coecients of the corresponding equation in Table 5 are insignicant.
These ndings are in line with several recent VAR studies which conclude that the
real impact of monetary policy shocks on the Dutch economy is modest or insignicant
(Garretsen and Swank [1998], Kakes [1998]). As for the two theoretical explanations
for asymmetry we discussed in Section 2, this is not a surprise. First, with respect to
the credit-based explanation, Kakes [1998] concludes that banks are likely to play an
important role by insulating their loans portfolio from monetary impulses and that
there may be a shift from low-quality to high-quality borrowers following a monetary
contraction. Although this suggests that credit constraints seem to be relevant for
a part of the borrowers|which has also been found in a panel data study among
Dutch rms by Van Ees et al. [1998]|the eventual real eects of monetary shocks
are found to be small. Second, as Dutch trade unions and employers|the so-called
`social partners'|show cooperative behaviour, real wages are relatively ﬂexible, which
may partly oset the real eects of monetary policy. A modest growth in wages,
irrespective of the stance of monetary policy or the phase of the business cycle, implies
that asymmetry based on price|or, in this case, wage|rigidity in only one direction
is unlikely. It can thus be concluded that both strands of theories that are discussed
in Section 2 are probably not very relevant for the Netherlands.
A further explanation of may be that the Netherlands have only very limited
monetary autonomy because of the exchange rate peg to the Dmark, which implies
that monetary policy cannot be used for domestic purposes. Hence, the relationship
15NET1








































Figure 12: Dynamic simulations with NET2
between monetary policy|which is for the most part indirectly determined by the
Bundesbank|and domestic real developments may become weaker. At the same
time, this would imply that monetary policy, which is largely an exogenous factor for
this country, is not likely to be an important independent source of business cycles.
Endogeneity of monetary policy
Our results thus far suggest that asymmetric eects of monetary policy over the cycle,
measured by the short-term interest rate, can be established for the United States,
Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium, but not for the Netherlands. Our use
of the short-term interest rate level as an indicator of monetary policy stance may
be criticized, though, as this variable presumably reﬂects endogenous responses of
monetary policymakers to events|e.g. oil price shocks|that have real eects by
themselves, or which can be anticipated and should therefore be ineective. Hence,
we repeat the analysis using unanticipated innovations "r
t of the short-term interest
16rate as an indicator of monetary policy:





We generated these shocks from the short-term interest rate equation of a VAR
model that further includes prices, industrial production and the oil price (all in logs,
except the short-term interest rate).8 Obviously, there may be a conceptual problem
here since we use a linear, or single-regime, framework to derive policy shocks. Hence,
we implicitly assume that the Central Bank's reaction function remains constant over
the business cycle.9
Using this alternative indicator, we nd again evidence of asymmetric cyclical
eects for the United States and Germany, while the outcomes for the other three
countries are either implausible|i.e. have the wrong signs|or insignicant. Partic-
ularly for Belgium and the Netherlands, this may be due to major changes in their
monetary policy regimes during our sample. Hence, for these economies the concept
of a VAR-based policy indicator is to some extent undermined by the fact that the
sample is not a homogeneous period.10 Using a shorter sample is not a real option
here, however, since we need a period in which a number of recessions have actually
taken place.
The estimation results for the United States and Germany, using the VAR-based
indicator, are presented in Tables 6 and 7. Models US4 and US5 provide strong ev-
idence for asymmetry. For regime 1, nearly all coecients have a negative sign and
most of them are statistically signicant. In the case of regime 2, by contrast, all
coecients except one are not signicantly dierent from zero. Comparing models
US5 and US3 (Table 1), one may conclude that unanticipated monetary policy shocks
"r
t work relatively fast in recessions while changes in rt, which reﬂect both anticipated
and unanticipated elements, become eective after a signicant time lag. Further-
more, the accumulated eect of an unanticipated shock, indicated by model US5, is
more than four times as large as the accumulated eect in model US3. This dier-
ence in impact should be interpreted with care, though, as the estimated parameters
are not elasticities but reﬂect the eect of absolute changes in the level of the policy
variables.
The impact of an unanticipated monetary policy shock in Germany, reported
by GER3 and the more restricted model GER4, is also strongly asymmetric: the
8Innovations are identied by a Choleski decomposition with the interest rate ordered last. Since
the latter is considered as the policy variable, the corresponding equation can be interpreted as the
Central Bank's reaction function.
9Stiglitz [1998] argues that policymakers are likely to to intervene if the economy turns into a
recession, while they will be less inclined to take measures to oset an expansion. Although this
pertains to macroeconomic policy in general, rather than only monetary policy, it suggests that the
reaction function may be asymmetric over the cycle.
10Bagliano and Favero [1998] show that VAR models estimated over more than one monetary
regime may lead to serious misspecication problems.



























Figure 13: Dynamic simulations with US5 and GER4
coecients of the recession state are signicantly negative, while the coecients of
the expansionary regime are not signicant. Like in the United States, unanticipated
monetary policy shocks seem to work faster, and are more than three times as eective
as changes in the short-term interest rate in general (see model GER2 in Table 2).
Recession probabilities that can be calculated with US5 and GER4 are very similar
to the graphs presented in Figures 3 and 5 and are therefore not reported. Dynamic
simulations are shown in Figure 13. We only calculate the responses to a one-period
(`temporary') increase in "r
t, since it is dicult to give an interpretation to a `perma-
nent' shock in this case. Comparing the results with the corresponding simulations in
Figures 4 and 6, it appears indeed that these unanticipated shocks work more rapidly
and have a larger impact.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper, the relation between monetary policy and business cycle asymmetries
is investigated. Using a nonlinear framework, business cycle asymmetry is interpreted
as being reﬂected by two alternating regimes which represent the expansionary and
contractionary phase. Asymmetric eects of monetary policy over the business cycle
can be investigated by looking at the impact of monetary policy indicators in each
regime. We looked at two interest-based policy measures: (1) the short-term interest
rate level which is supposed to summarize the stance of monetary policy, and (2)
short-term interest innovations that are generated from an identied VAR model,
which can be interpreted as unanticipated monetary policy shocks.
For the United States and Germany, we found strong evidence for asymmetry for
both monetary policy indicators. Furthermore, the regimes that were distinguished
exhibit plausible business cycle characteristics. In the case of the United States, the
18recession periods that can be inferred from our approach are remarkably close to the
NBER recession dates. For the United Kingdom and Belgium, only the rst policy
indicator implies asymmetry, while the second indicator yields implausible results.
The overall conclusion is thus that strong evidence for asymmetry of monetary
policy over the business cycle can be found for the United States and Germany and,
to a lesser extent, for the United Kingdom and Belgium, while our ndings for the
Netherlands suggest that monetary policy is not eective in either phase of the cycle.
The fact that we hardly nd real eects of monetary policy in the Netherlands is in
line with recent VAR studies. For the other countries, existing studies imply that in
particular nancial market imperfections play an important role in rms' investment
behaviour, which suggests that the nancial accelerator may be a relevant mechanism
underlying the observed asymmetry. An important implication of this paper is that
standard linear approaches, such as VAR models, ignore important aspects of the
monetary transmission mechanism. Presumably, conclusions about the eectiveness
of monetary policy that are found in these studies can be attributed to particular
periods.
5D a t a
All the data we used are taken from the IMF's International Financial Statistics.W e
use the overnight interest rate (IFS line 60b) for each country as our policy variable
and industrial production (IFS line 66) as a measure of real activity. In addition,
we use each country's consumer price index (IFS line 64) and the oil price (IFS line
00176nid) to construct our VAR-based policy variable.
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24US1 US2 US3
St 121212
c -0.0124 0.0108 -0.0003 0.0095 -0.0022 0.0105
yt−1 1.4822 1.1485 1.2403 1.0767 1.3201 1.0491
yt−2 -1.3175 -0.4619 -0.9618 -0.3308 -0.9573 -0.4077
yt−3 0.8429 0.2889 0.4679 0.2408 0.4422 0.3196
yt−4 -1.2239 -0.4823 -0.7981 -0.4005 -0.7992 -0.4323
yt−5 0.6500 0.4203 0.6310 0.2728 0.6665 0.2782




rt−4 -0.0015 -0.0058 -0.0012 -0.0056
rt−5 -0.0030 0.0100 -0.0034 0.0106
rt−6 0.0009 -0.0054 0.0005 -0.0064
qii 0.7762 0.9527 0.7870 0.9287 0.7766 0.9241
yt -0.029 0.039 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.039
lnL 280.03 293.01 290.66
Bold gures indicate signicance at a 90% condence level.
Table 1: United States
GER1 GER2
St 1212
c -0.0102 0.0157 -0.0089 0.0161
yt−1 1.0378 0.4784 1.0569 0.4933
yt−2 -0.3206 0.1420 -0.3386 0.1367
yt−3 -0.1724 0.2692 -0.1494 0.2477
yt−4 -0.5880 -0.4917 -0.5765 -0.4929






rt−6 -0.0047 -0.0023 -0.0041 -0.0010
qii 0.8623 0.9170 0.8665 0.9134






c 0.0041 0.0081 0.0047 0.0076
yt−1 0.7693 1.1387 0.7383 1.1232
yt−2 -0.0401 -0.4771 -0.0446 -0.4353
yt−3 0.1884 0.1763 0.2350 0.1426
yt−4 -1.0419 -0.2566 -1.0996 -0.2779
yt−5 1.0484 0.1935 1.0108 0.2616
yt−6 -0.1598 -0.0951 -0.1414 -0.1065
rt−1 0.0036 -0.0008 0.0053 -0.0002




rt−6 -0.0039 0.0020 -0.0069 0.0010
qii 0.8240 0.8574 0.8331 0.8968
yt 0.007 0.020 0.002 0.020
lnL 263.64 261.67
See Table 1
Table 3: United Kingdom
BEL1 BEL2
St 1212
c -0.0011 0.0242 -0.0026 0.0300
yt−1 0.4546 0.2719 0.4680 0.3961
yt−2 0.0236 0.0852 0.1057 0.2856
yt−3 -0.1283 0.4761 -0.0535 0.3041
yt−4 -0.1140 -0.4350 -0.0469 -0.6596
rt−1 0.0013 0.0017
rt−2 0.0003 -0.0001
rt−3 -0.0075 0.0014 -0.0054 0.0030
rt−4 -0.0015 -0.0049 -0.0051 -0.0009
rt−5 0.0013 0.0029
rt−6 -0.0027 -0.0021
qii 0.8966 0.8898 0.8255 0.7175






c 0.0108 0.0031 0.0140 0.0034
yt−1 0.6561 0.5006 0.6325 0.4977
yt−2 -0.1622 0.2303 -0.1349 0.2214
yt−3 0.1129 0.0679 0.1915 0.0907
yt−4 -1.3517 -0.3961 -1.4460 -0.3933
yt−5 0.9496 0.2498 1.0167 0.2316
yt−6 -0.6636 0.1532 -0.7428 0.1508
rt−1 0.0006 0.0006
rt−2 0.0031 -0.0012 0.0029 -0.0010
rt−3 -0.0034 0.0012 -0.0032 0.0016
rt−4 0.0034 -0.0028 0.0032 -0.0029
rt−5 -0.0038 -0.0002 -0.0035 -0.0008
rt−6 0.0025 -0.0019 0.0021 -0.0017
qii 0.7189 0.9489 0.6310 0.9205






c -0.0220 0.0140 -0.0216 0.0104
yt−1 0.9757 1.2014 0.9677 1.2031
yt−2 -0.5762 -0.5177 -0.5800 -0.5149
yt−3 0.4443 0.3400 0.4667 0.3353
yt−4 -1.5803 -0.6006 -1.6210 -0.5985
yt−5 1.3966 0.5496 1.4165 0.5478




t−2 -0.0060 0.0002 -0.0058 0.0002
"r
t−3 -0.0048 0.0008 -0.0043 0.0009
"r
t−4 0.0023 -0.0023 0.0020 -0.0023
"r
t−5 -0.0027 0.0013 -0.0018 0.0011
"r
t−6 -0.0064 0.0008 -0.0068 0.0008
qii 0.8172 0.9620 0.8275 0.9615
yt -0.010 0.037 -0.010 0.037
lnL 290.79 290.17
See Table 1
Table 6: VAR-based monetary shocks, United States
27GER3 GER4
St 1212
c -0.0030 0.0251 -0.0056 0.0226
yt−1 1.1337 0.3875 1.2083 0.4654
yt−2 -0.2013 0.2206 -0.2954 0.2335
yt−3 -0.1082 0.4022 -0.0447 0.2719
yt−4 -0.3217 -0.5793 -0.4550 -0.5376












t−6 -0.0065 0.0019 -0.0076 0.0019
qii 0.9255 0.8932 0.9349 0.9277
yt -0.003 0.035 -0.012 0.032
lnL 267.88 265.67
See Table 1
Table 7: VAR-based monetary shocks, Germany
28